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This paper explores the empirical relationship between bank competition, bank concentration, and the emergence of credit reporting institutions. The authors find that countries with lower entry barriers into the banking market (that is, a greater threat of competition) are less likely to have a credit bureau, presumably because banks are less willing to share proprietary information when the threat of market entry is high. In addition, a credit bureau is significantly less likely to emerge in economies characterized by a high degree of bank concentration. The authors argue that the reason for this This paper is a product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Team, Development Research Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at mbruhn@worldbank.org, sfarazi@worldbank.org, and mkanz@worldbank.org. finding is that large banks stand to lose more monopoly rents from sharing their extensive information with smaller players. In contrast, the data show no significant relationship between bank competition or concentration and the emergence of a public credit registry, where banks' participation is mandatory. The results highlight that policies designed to promote the voluntary creation of a credit bureau need to take into account banks' incentives to extract monopoly rents from proprietary credit information.
Introduction
Extensive credit information sharing can have several benefits for the financial system. First, economic theory predicts that reliable credit information can address the fundamental problem of asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders (Padilla and Pagano, 2000, and Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) . Cross-country evidence confirms that the availability of detailed information about the borrowing and repayment behavior of prospective clients places banks in a better position to assess default risk, counter adverse selection, and monitor institutional exposures to credit risk (Pagano and Jappelli, 1993 , Japelli and Pagano, 2002 , Miller 2003 . A recent study of a Guatemalan micro-lender provides evidence that information sharing is also effective at altering borrower behavior, countering moral hazard, and improving repayment rates (de Janvry, McIntosh, and Sadoulet, 2010) . Perhaps most importantly, credit reporting allows borrowers to build a credit history and to use a documented track record of responsible borrowing and repayment as "reputational collateral" to access credit outside established lending relationships (Love and Mylenko 2003) . 2 In addition, financial regulators can draw on credit reporting systems to understand the credit risk faced by financial institutions and systemically important borrowers, to define capital provisioning requirements, and to conduct essential oversight functions.
Despite the numerous benefits of information sharing for credit market efficiency, credit reporting institutions do not always emerge spontaneously. About 26 percent of countries do not have any credit reporting institution at all. Another 19 percent have only a public (i.e. government mandated) credit registry, but no credit bureau 3 . One reason why a credit bureau may not emerge voluntarily is that the private returns to information sharing are not necessarily aligned with its public returns. This paper examines two features of the banking marketcompetition and concentration -that can influence private returns to joining a credit bureau and that can thus affect the probability of a credit bureau emerging.
Pagano and Jappelli (1993) develop a model which predicts that the incentive to share information is greater when lenders are protected from competition by barriers to entry. Brown and Zehnder (2010) find empirical evidence for a negative relationship between competition and 2 See also Padilla and Pagano (2000) 3 Based on the Doing Business dataset that is described in more detail in section 3.
3 emergence of voluntary information sharing in a laboratory experiment. To our knowledge, our paper is the first to empirically test the relationship between banking competition and the voluntary emergence of a credit bureau with cross-country data. We use two recent, underexplored datasets on credit reporting institutions and bank entry barriers that allow us to study this relationship in a sample of close to 195 countries. In line with the existing literature, we find that countries with higher bank entry barriers (i.e. a lower threat of competition) are significantly more likely to have a credit bureau. However, we also show that where a credit bureau exists, the absence of competitive pressures is associated with less depth and transparency of the credit information that is made available by lenders.
We also test an additional set of related hypotheses. Pagano and Jappelli (1993) argue that banks may not join a credit bureau, or share only limited or incomplete client data, since they can capture monopoly rents by not sharing proprietary credit information. We point out that, due to increasing returns to scale, the disincentive for information sharing is particularly relevant for very large banks. This implies that barriers to credit information sharing may be particularly pronounced in markets characterized by a high degree of bank concentration. Our data support this hypothesis: countries with higher bank concentration are significantly less likely to have a credit bureau. We also find some evidence that bank concentration is associated with lower coverage of the information reported to existing credit bureaus, potentially because banks try to hold on to monopoly rents by sharing only partial information.
Finally, bank competition or concentration should not be correlated with the probability of having a credit registry since participation in a registry is mandatory and banks' incentives are only relevant for voluntary information sharing. Confirming this hypothesis, we find no correlation between bank competition or concentration and the existence of a credit registry.
This paper contributes to the broader empirical literature on the relevance of bank competition and concentration for the efficiency of financial intermediation. One strand of this literature argues that competition has a negative impact on systemic stability and the efficiency of financial intermediation since greater bank competition may weaken screening incentives (Boot and Thakor, 1993) and can lead to excessive risk-taking (Allen and Gale, 2000, and Hellman, competition may hamper stability and efficiency of financial intermediation: when the threat of entry is high, private credit reporting institutions are less likely to emerge, leading to a reduced availability of credit information for screening and risk-management. While stronger competitive pressures in a country's banking sector hinder the establishment of a private credit reporting institution, greater bank competition is not unambiguously negative. In additional results we show that, conditional on having a private credit bureau, information sharing is more comprehensive and transparent in economies characterized by greater bank competition.
The existing literature has also argued that a high degree of bank concentration (as measured for example by the market share of the largest financial institutions) tends to have a negative impact on the efficiency of financial intermediation. Banks with greater market power can exploit their position to charge higher interest rates (Boyd and De Nicoló, 2005) and large banks in highly concentrated banking systems are more likely to benefit from implicit government guarantees that may distort market incentives (Schaeck, Čihák, and Wolfe, 2009 ). The findings presented in this paper suggest an additional reason why bank concentration may lower the efficiency of financial intermediation: high concentration is accompanied by sizable monopoly rents to information and thus lowers the returns to voluntary information sharing.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we summarize related research on the emergence of credit reporting institutions and state our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 discusses our empirical strategy. In section 5, we present the results and section 6 concludes.
Background and hypotheses
As outlined in the introduction, the exchange of comprehensive credit information among lenders is beneficial for credit market efficiency and financial stability. However, private returns to information sharing are not necessarily aligned with its public returns. This misalignment can limit the voluntary exchange of credit information among lenders. We study two features of the competitive structure of a country's financial sector -bank competition and bank concentration -5 that can influence private returns to joining a credit bureau and can thereby also affect the emergence, coverage, and depth of credit reporting systems.
Pagano and Jappelli (1993) point out that membership in a credit bureau entails both benefits and costs. On the one hand, lenders gain access to better information about potential borrowers. On the other hand, they also lose the informational advantage over their own borrowers. This leads to more competition among lenders and reduces monopoly rents to information. Paganao and Jappelli develop a model which predicts that the incentive to share information is greater when lenders are protected from competition by barriers to entry. To our knowledge, our paper is the first to empirically test the relationship between bank competition and the voluntary emergence of a credit bureau outside the laboratory setting. Based on the theoretical argument in Pagano and Jappelli, we first test the following hypothesis:
H.1: Countries with lower banking sector competition (high barriers to entry) have a higher probability of having a private credit reporting institution.
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Intuitively, this hypothesis arises from the fact that lenders sharing credit information in a market characterized by high barriers to entry are shielded from the possibility that new competitors will use this information to gain market share. This protection reduces the private cost of sharing credit information relative to the case in which barriers to market entry are low. It also resonates with stylized evidence on the persistence of "closed user groups", consisting of a small number of lenders that seek to limit entry by capturing the market for credit information.
Our next hypothesis starts with the observation that for any given bank the costs and benefits of joining a credit bureau also depend on how much information the bank already has relative to other lenders in the market. Banks with a large market share earn higher monopoly rents on their borrower information than banks with a smaller market share, and they thus also stand to lose more informational rents after joining a credit bureau. In addition, these large players may have relatively little to gain from sharing information since their set of potential borrowers is comparatively small to their set of existing borrowers. Taken together, these points lead to our second hypothesis:
H.2: Countries with lower bank concentration have a higher probability of developing private credit reporting institutions, since returns to information sharing are declining in a bank's market share.
Note that the theoretical arguments leading to both hypotheses 1 and 2 rely on the assumption that banks voluntarily decide whether to share information in a credit reporting institution or not.
These arguments do thus not apply to intuitions that make information sharing obligatory, i.e. In addition, banks with a large market share may be more reluctant to share full information with an existing credit bureau in an effort to preserve their market share, resulting in our last hypothesis:
H.5: Lower bank concentration is associated with higher coverage, depth, and transparency of information reported to the credit bureau in countries where a bureau exists.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to test these hypotheses systematically for a large set of countries. Our empirical analysis is made possible by two recent and previously underexplored datasets, as described in the following section.
Data description

Doing Business database on credit reporting institutions
Our data on credit reporting institutions come Based on this raw data, we constructed two variables indicating the existence of credit reporting institutions in 2010. The first variable is a dummy that is equal to one if the country has a credit bureau and zero otherwise. The second variable is a dummy that is equal to one if the country has a credit registry and zero otherwise 5 . The Doing Business team defines a credit registry as a publically owned entity that collects information on borrowers and shares it with regulated financial institutions. A credit bureau is a privately owned entity which collects information on borrowers in the financial system and facilitates the exchange of credit among lenders. For the purpose of this paper and the hypotheses stated in section 2, the key distinction is that the credit registry makes reporting of loan information mandatory for banks (in many cases for loans above a certain threshold only), whereas participation in a credit bureau is voluntary. reputational collateral can increase access to finance. Credit bureaus in about 65 percent of the 94 countries for which this variable is available share positive information (Table 1) . Figure 3 plots the two measures of depth of credit bureau information across country income groups. Both measures follow a similar pattern in that middle income countries have the greatest depth of information, followed by low income countries and then high income countries.
Finally, the transparency index is a tally of affirmative responses to five questions. These questions ascertain whether borrowers are guaranteed access to their credit history data by law, whether they can inspect their data in practice, and whether there is a cost for inspecting one's own credit information. The average of this index is about 2.5 (table 1) . Middle income and high income countries have higher levels of credit bureau transparency on average than low income countries (figure 4).
Measures of competition and concentration
As a measure of banking competition, we chose to use the log minimum capital requirement (in Data on the minimum capital requirement and on bank concentration is only available for about 135 countries, thus reducing the number of countries included in our empirical analysis.
Control variables
The last panel of table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the control variables used in this 
Empirical strategy
In order to test empirically whether lower competition and concentration in the banking market are associated with a higher probability of a credit bureau emerging, we estimate the following cross-country equation
In this equation, indexes countries, the outcome variable is equal to one if the country has a credit bureau and equal to zero otherwise, is our measure of bank competition (log minimum capital requirement), is our measure of banking concentration (asset share of the largest three banks), is a vector of country control variables and is the error term. We estimate the equation through a Probit regression with robust standard errors.
The country control variables include several characteristics that could be correlated with both our explanatory variables of interest (competition and concentration) and the emergence of a credit bureau. As discussed in section 3, these variables are GDP per capita, the credit to GDP ratio, measures of the institutional environment, legal origin dummies, the asset share of government-owned banks and the asset share of foreign-owned banks.
In line with hypothesis 1 stated in section 2, we expect the coefficient on competition ( ) to be positive. Banks in countries with a higher minimum capital requirement, i.e. with higher entry 13 barriers, should be more willing to share information since the entry barriers shield them from competition. Hypothesis 2 implies that the coefficient on bank concentration ( ) should be negative. We expect countries with higher bank concentration to have a lower probability of having a private credit bureau since large banks stand to gain more from not sharing information with other banks.
In order to test hypothesis 3, we replace the outcome variable in equation (1) with an indicator variable that is equal to one if the country has a credit registry and equal to zero otherwise. We expect to find that the coefficients on competition ( ) and concentration ( ) are statistically equal to zero in the regression that uses the credit registry indicator as the outcome variable.
Our tests of hypotheses 4 and 5 also use regressions based on equation (1) Two important concerns when using cross-country estimation as in equation (1) addition, we chose to use a regulatory variable (log minimum capital requirement) as our measure of competition instead of a measure of market power, such as the Lerner index. Market power is determined by entry regulation and other factors, including the existence and depth of credit information (see GFDR, Box 3.6). Entry regulation on the other hand, is less likely to respond to availability of credit information, assuming that regulators set minimum capital requirements independently of the existence of a credit bureau.
Results
We first estimate equation (1) by including either competition or concentration in the regressions (table 2 and table 3) countries, compared to close to 100 countries included in the other specifications.
Columns 5 through 8 replicate the regressions in column 1 and 4, but use the probability that a country has a credit registry as the outcome variable. According to hypothesis 3 in section 2, we do not expect competition to be negatively associated with the emergence of a credit registry since participation in a credit registry is mandatory and thus not dependent on banks' willingness to share information. The results in columns 5 through 8 of table 2 confirm this hypothesis. We do not find a statistically significant relationship between the log minimum capital requirement and the probability of having a credit registry.
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Many of the control variables included in table 2 are not statistically significant in the regressions, with the exception of the legal origin dummies and bank ownership variables.
Countries with French, German, or transition legal origin are less likely to have a credit bureau than countries with British legal origin. In contrast, countries with French or German legal origin are more likely to have a credit registry than countries with British origin 7 . A higher share of government owned banks is associated with a lower probability of having a credit bureau and with a higher probability of having a credit registry. More foreign bank ownership is correlated with a lower likelihood of having a credit bureau, perhaps because coordination between banks is more difficult when some are headquartered abroad. between bank concentration and the probability of having a credit registry, as predicted by hypothesis 3. Table 4 replicates the analysis from tables 2 and 3, but includes both our measures of competition and concentration in the regressions 8 . The findings are largely consistent with the results in table 2 and 3. In columns 1 through 4, the coefficients on both log minimum capital requirement and bank concentration decrease in magnitude relative to tables 2 and 3, but remain statistically significant in the specifications that include the larger sets of control variables.
We test hypotheses 4 and 5 in tables 5 through 7. That is, we investigate whether, conditional on a credit bureau having emerged, bank competition and concentration are associated with 7 This is consistent with the findings in Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007) and Jappelli and Pagano (2002) . 8 A potential issue with including both the measures of competition and concentration in the same regression is that they may be highly correlated. However, although banking competition and concentration are related concepts, they are conceptually distinct. A banking sector can be open to competition (i.e. have low barriers to entry) and concentrated at the same time. In fact, in our sample, the correlation between the log minimum capital requirement and bank concentration is relatively low (-0.24).
coverage, depth, and transparency of the information listed in the credit bureau. Tables 5 through   7 Finally, in Table 7 , we investigate how bank competition and concentration are related to the transparency of credit reporting, using the credit bureau transparency index (described in section 3) as the outcome of interest. Similarly to our results on the depth of information, we find that higher bank entry barriers are associated with lower transparency in credit reporting. This finding 17 may again be due to the administrative costs of providing transparent information. Banks may be reluctant to incur these administrative costs in the absence of competitive pressures that would make having transparent information on potential clients more valuable.
The findings in table 6 and 7 are also consistent with stylized evidence on the tendency for "closed user groups" to emerge in a financial sector that is not competitive. This term refers to groups of lenders that formally or informally exchange credit information between each other, but restrict access to smaller competitors and new entrants by limiting either the quality or extent of information that is disclosed to the market as a whole.
Overall, the results in tables 2 though 4 provide empirical support for hypotheses 1 through 3.
Lower bank competition is associated with a higher probability of a credit bureau emerging, and lower bank concentration is associated with a higher probability of a credit bureau emerging voluntarily. As expected, neither bank competition nor concentration is correlated with the existence of a credit registry where participation is mandatory. We do not find evidence in favor of hypothesis 4. On the contrary, the results how that, countries with higher entry barriers tend to have less comprehensive and transparent credit bureau information (possibly because administrative costs of providing extensive information weigh more heavily than gains to this information in the absence of competitive pressures). However, in line with hypothesis 5, some of the results weakly suggest that higher bank concentration is associated with lower coverage of the credit bureau.
Conclusion
This paper explores the empirical relationship among banking sector competition, bank concentration, and the emergence of a credit bureau across countries. Based on the previous theoretical literature (Pagano and Jappelli, 1993), we argue that countries with higher entry barriers should be more likely to have a credit bureau since entry barriers lower the threat of competition and of losing monopoly rents by sharing proprietary credit information. The data confirm this hypothesis: going from the 25 th percentile of entry barriers to the 75 th percentile is associated with a 15 percentage point increase in the likelihood of having a credit bureau.
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However, we also show that where a credit bureau exists, the absence of competitive pressures is associated with less depth and transparency of the credit information that is made available by lenders.
We further argue that, due to increasing returns to scale, the disincentive for information sharing in order to maintain monopoly rents is particularly relevant for very large banks. This implies that barriers to credit information sharing may be particularly pronounced in markets characterized by a high degree of bank concentration. Our empirical results support this argument. They indicate that going from the 25 th percentile of bank concentration to the 75 th percentile, is associated with a 17.6 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of having a credit bureau. We also find some evidence that bank concentration is associated with lower coverage of the information reported to existing credit bureaus, potentially because banks try to hold on to monopoly rents by sharing only partial information.
Finally, bank competition or concentration should not be correlated with the probability of having a credit registry since participation in a registry is mandatory and banks' incentives are only relevant for voluntary information sharing. Confirming this hypothesis, we find no correlation between bank competition or concentration and the existence of credit registries.
Taken together, results highlight that policies designed to promote the voluntary exchange of credit information need to take into account banks' incentives to extract monopoly rents from proprietary credit information. In addition, policymakers who determine entry barriers into the banking market should be aware of the side-effects that these barriers can have on voluntary information sharing. Share of government banks Share of assets of government owned banks to total assets of the banking sector.
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